

Multiple Ways To Defeat Office Genuine Advantage (OGA)

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Straight from Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_Genuine_Advantage) :

Office Genuine Advantage (OGA) is a program currently (as of [2006-05-03](#)) being piloted by [Microsoft](#) similar to [Windows Genuine Advantage](#) in that it requires users of the [Microsoft Office](#) software to validate their copy of [Microsoft Office](#).

Currently, Microsoft Office software is validated by using something called the [Office Validation Assistant](#) (OVA) which is available on Microsoft's web site. Validation using the OVA is not presently required. Use of Office Genuine Advantage to obtain Office updates and downloads, as of [2006-10-27](#) is mandatory in most countries.

Starting in January 2007, users of Office Update will have to validate the legitimacy of their Office software before they can use the service. Pirated copies (that is, copies that won't pass product activation) of Microsoft Office 2007 will work in a "reduced functionality mode" (in which you can view but can't edit any document)

Whilst there may be multiple ways to defeat such software piracy control, in this document I will explain two simple methods to defeat Office Genuine Advantage validation check.

Method 1: Bypass OGA by using Google search

This a very simple bypass method. Check out this download link for Office related updates or add-ins <http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/downloads/default.aspx>.

Select the Office version from the above link and try downloading any updates/add-ins related to that specific version. It will lead to a validation link (Refer the screenshot below) which will check whether the office installed in the system is genuine or not.

In short, the OGA validation generates a hash out of information gathered from the installed MS Office and passes it on to the server for verification. The user will be directed to the download link only if the installed office version is genuine.

To bypass such validation, follow these simple steps:

- Select the add-ins / updates that you require for office
- In the Validation required page, copy the file name (Refer to the following screenshot)

Office 2003 Add-in: Word Redaction v1.2 ✨

Brief Description

Use the Word 2003 Redaction Add-in to hide text within Microsoft Office Word 2003 documents. You can mark text to redact and then redacted version of the document in which the marked text is replaced with a black bar that cannot be converted back to text.

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Validation Required

This download is available to customers running [genuine Microsoft Office](#). Please click the **Continue** button to begin Office validation. Microsoft will not use the information collected during validation to identify or contact you.

Quick Details

File Name:	RedactionSetup.msi
Version:	1.0
Date Published:	5/2/2006
Language:	English
Download Size:	1004 KB
Estimated Download Time:	Dial-up (56K) 3 min

- Use google search for the filename using the following search keyword combination:
site:download.microsoft.com/download <File Name>

For Example: To search for the file name "RedactionSetup.msi" use the following search key combination site:download.microsoft.com/download RedactionSetup.msi

- The above search result provides the direct link to the file available on the Microsoft download server which can be used to directly download the file without any validation check (Refer to the following screenshot).

The screenshot shows a Google search interface. The search bar contains the text "site:download.microsoft.com/download Reda". The search results are displayed under the "Web" tab. A red box highlights a search result with the URL "download.microsoft.com/download/4/1/0/41057277-487f-4582-bdeb-87b84879bc4d/RedactionSetup.msi - Similar pages". A red arrow points from the text "Direct link to download RedactionSetup.msi" to the highlighted URL.

Method 2: Bypass OGA by re-using the product hash

It is possible to re-use the hash generated in any machine having a genuine copy of MS Office and can be distributed over the internet.

For example – The table below has hashes for downloading rhdtool.exe and RedactionSetup.msi which can be re-used by any user having pirated copy of Office to defeat OGA validation check.

[http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyID=144E54ED-D43E-42CA-BC7B5446D34E5360&displaylang=en&Hash=\[Put the hash here\]](http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyID=144E54ED-D43E-42CA-BC7B5446D34E5360&displaylang=en&Hash=[Put the hash here])

Office 2003/XP Add-in:	Remove Hidden Data [rhdtool.exe]
FamilyID	144E54ED-D43E-42CA-BC7B-5446D34E5360
Hash	GV44ca [REDACTED] ST43JYu2tbJIUyCgXIkWLgWm5GVMtHsO61Dnfq Qr [REDACTED] =

Office 2003/XP Add-in:	Word Redaction v1.2 [RedactionSetup.msi]
FamilyID	144E54ED-D43E-42CA-BC7B-5446D34E5360
Hash	[REDACTED] +ow+1+ZIEDGnzI+W4yRMKLNw7zwHNJZ8vtrYFeoBYkG++lz7b FByo [REDACTED]

Method 3: A Quick Analysis of OGACheckControl.dll

Last but not the least is the reverse analysis of OGACheckControl.dll and creating a patched version to bypass OGA check.

I did a quick reverse analysis and found few interesting sections which confirmed that creating a patch, in this case, is going to be much simpler than I thought it to be. However, I do not intend to release any binary patch to bypass the OGA check in the wild at this stage and get my name tagged as a software pirate. Therefore, sharing these details only for reference only.

Regardless, those who know how to create a binary patch or have minimal knowledge of reversing will easily figure out themselves.

▪ Call to Hash creation routine

```
:00427A72 loc_427A72: ; CODE XREF: sub_42784F+1F2↑j
:00427A72 lea    eax, [ebp+hHash]
:00427A75 push   eax ; pHHash
:00427A76 push   ebx ; dwFlags
:00427A77 push   ebx ; hKey
:00427A78 push   8003h ; Algid
:00427A7D push   [ebp+hProv] ; hProv
:00427A80 call   ds:CryptCreateHash
:00427A86 test   eax, eax
:00427A88 jnz    short loc_427AB1
:00427A8A call   ds:__imp_GetLastError
:00427A90 cmp    eax, ebx
:00427A92 jle    short loc_427A9E
:00427A94 and    eax, 0FFFFh
:00427A99 or     eax, 80070000h
```

```
:00427AB1 loc_427AB1: ; CODE XREF: sub_42784F+239↑j
:00427AB1 cmp    esi, ebx
:00427AB3 jl     loc_427BA0
:00427AB9 push   ebx ; dwFlags
:00427ABA push   6Dh ; dwDataLen
:00427ABC lea    eax, [ebp+pbData]
:00427ABF push   eax ; pbData
:00427AC0 push   [ebp+hHash] ; hHash
:00427AC3 call   ds:CryptHashData
:00427AC9 test   eax, eax
:00427ACB jnz    short loc_427AF4
:00427ACD call   ds:__imp_GetLastError
:00427AD3 cmp    eax, ebx
:00427AD5 jle    short loc_427AE1
:00427AD7 and    eax, 0FFFFh
:00427ADC or     eax, 80070000h
```

```
:00427A57 loc_427A57: ; CODE XREF: sub_42784F+1FC↑j
:00427A57 push   ebx
:00427A58 mov    esi, eax
:00427A5A push   esi
:00427A5B push   122h
:00427A60 push   offset aD4ab90a5 ; "D4AB90A5"
:00427A65 call   sub_421227
:00427A6A cmp    esi, ebx
:00427A6C jl     loc_427BA0
```

- **Modification of OGA code and 'subcode' value in registry:** This can be patched to keep the value as code=100 and subcode=200 always

```

:0042AFC0 ; int __stdcall sub_42AFC0(int, BYTE Data)
:0042AFC0 sub_42AFC0      proc near                               ; CODE XREF: sub_42B0F8+73↓p
:0042AFC0
:0042AFC0 hKey          = dword ptr -10Ch
:0042AFC0 SubKey        = byte ptr -108h
:0042AFC0 var_4         = dword ptr -4
:0042AFC0 arg_0         = dword ptr 8
:0042AFC0 Data         = byte ptr 0Ch
:0042AFC0
:0042AFC0          push    ebp
:0042AFC1          mov     ebp, esp
:0042AFC3          sub     esp, 10Ch
:0042AFC9          mov     eax, dword_4975A0
:0042AFCE          xor     eax, ebp
:0042AFD0          mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
:0042AFD3          push   ebx
:0042AFD4          push   esi
:0042AFD5          push   edi
:0042AFD6          xor     ebx, ebx
:0042AFD8          push   103h
:0042AFDD          lea   eax, [ebp-107h]
:0042AFE3          push   ebx
:0042AFE4          push   eax
:0042AFE5          mov     esi, ecx
:0042AFE7          mov     [ebp+hKey], ebx
:0042AFED          mov     [ebp+SubKey], bl
:0042AFF3          call   sub_41218F

```

```

:0042AFF8          add     esp, 0Ch
:0042AFFB          push   [ebp+arg_0]      ; Data
:0042AFFE          mov     ecx, esi
:0042B000          call   sub_421929
:0042B005          push   ebx
:0042B006          mov     esi, eax
:0042B008          push   esi
:0042B009          push   101h
:0042B00E          mov     edi, offset a81af8c18 ; "81AF8C18"
:0042B013          push   edi
:0042B014          call   sub_421227
:0042B019          cmp     esi, ebx
:0042B01B          jl     loc_42B0D1
:0042B021          push   offset aOfficeGenuineA ; "Office Genuine Advantage"
:0042B026          push   offset aSoftwareMicros ; "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\%s"
:0042B02B          lea   eax, [ebp+SubKey]
:0042B031          push   104h
:0042B036          push   eax
:0042B037          call   sub_40F560
:0042B03C          add     esp, 10h
:0042B03F          push   ebx
:0042B040          mov     esi, eax
:0042B042          push   esi
:0042B043          push   107h
:0042B048          push   edi
:0042B049          call   sub_421227
:0042B04E          cmp     esi, ebx
:0042B050          jl     short loc_42B0D1

```

```

:0042B052      push     ebx                ; lpdwDisposition
:0042B053      lea     eax, [ebp+hKey]
:0042B059      push     eax                ; phkResult
:0042B05A      push     ebx                ; lpSecurityAttributes
:0042B05B      push     2001Fh           ; samDesired
:0042B060      push     ebx                ; dwOptions
:0042B061      push     ebx                ; lpClass
:0042B062      push     ebx                ; Reserved
:0042B063      lea     eax, [ebp+SubKey]
:0042B069      push     eax                ; lpSubKey
:0042B06A      push     80000001h        ; hKey
:0042B06F      call    ds:RegCreateKeyExA
:0042B075      cmp     eax, ebx
:0042B077      jz      short loc_42B094
:0042B079      jle     short loc_42B085
:0042B07B      and     eax, 0FFFFh
:0042B080      or      eax, 80070000h

```

```

:0042B085
:0042B085 loc_42B085:                ; CODE XREF: sub_42AFC0+B9↑j
:0042B085      push     ebx
:0042B086      mov     esi, eax
:0042B088      push     esi
:0042B089      push     119h
:0042B08E      push     edi
:0042B08F      call    sub_421227
:0042B094
:0042B094 loc_42B094:                ; CODE XREF: sub_42AFC0+B7↑j
:0042B094      cmp     esi, ebx
:0042B096      jl      short loc_42B0D1
:0042B098      push     4                ; cbData
:0042B09A      lea     eax, [ebp+Data]
:0042B09D      push     eax                ; lpData
:0042B09E      push     4                ; dwType
:0042B0A0      push     ebx                ; Reserved
:0042B0A1      push     offset aSubcode ; "subcode"
:0042B0A6      push     [ebp+hKey]        ; hKey
:0042B0AC      call    ds:RegSetValueExA
:0042B0B2      cmp     eax, ebx
:0042B0B4      jz      short loc_42B0D1
:0042B0B6      jle     short loc_42B0C2
:0042B0B8      and     eax, 0FFFFh
:0042B0BD      or      eax, 80070000h
:0042B0C2

```